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This paper addresses the shifting identities of a disputed borderland 
territory, using the interwar Dobruja province as an example, and following the 
transformation of its political and ethnic boundaries through the eyes of various 
public participants in the dispute. Their views are explored as vital sources which 
reflect Bulgarian and Romanian policies in the region and their interactions with 
the Great Powers. The paper indicates that identity debates had very little 
influence on the actual population of the region, appealing mainly to various 
external powers and the political and intellectual “elites” of both countries. A 
state is viewed as a system of social networks, therefore a contested border 
becomes a space where those interconnections assume the roles of nationalizing 
markers. Therefore, the paper proposes to regard a borderland dispute not as a 
typical pattern of othering, but as an attempt to establish interconnections and 
make it even more “national” than the regions non-contested. 
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Identifying a border 
The Dobrujan question, which first emerged after the signing of the Treaty 
of Berlin in 1878, became a vital issue in Romanian-Bulgarian relations after the 
Second Balkan War and Romanian expansion into the southern part of the region, 
Cadrilater. The territorial exchange that followed transformed the province into 
an arena for Bulgarian and Romanian nationalist propaganda, characterized by 
competing state- and nation-building projects, identity debates and 
modernization programs (Kuzmanova 1989: 18-19). Presenting a case of shifting 
identities based on territorial disputes, the current text goes beyond descriptions 
of post-Ottoman integration strategies in the Balkans and focuses on the 
publications of several participants on both sides of the debate. Those accounts, 
in turn, reflect the persistent attempts by these participants to establish viable 
social and ideological interconnections between the contested territory and their 
respective states. 
While dealing with multiple regional entanglements (Marinov 2013: 3-13), 
the paper does not simply address the concept of “othering” applied to the 
advancement of various Bulgarian and Romanian state-building strategies 
(Mishkova 2008; Aretov 2012: 89-97), but rather proposes to view a borderland 
as a fluid space where social networks form. Furthermore, these networks, 
whether recent or long-standing, are based on certain legacies that render them 
“legitimate”. A state, as well as a nation, based on denial and/or acceptance of 
multiple previous, always reinterpreted and reformulated legacies (Todorova 
2004: 5), remains a subtle mechanism for primarily advancing the agendas of 
those who are actively involved in nation-building disputes. Taking the case of 
interwar Dobruja as an example, this paper strives to represent the construction 
of borderland identities as a project initially conceived by several prominent 
public actors and employed by the state in order to accommodate inevitable 
differences, yet excluding the opinions of the local population to a considerable 
extent. It had to be either incorporated or expelled from political life (Mylonas 
2012: 17-21). Therefore, the borderland became the ultimate battlefield, where 
identities were formed when a viable connection between a legacy and a social 
network was established. This pattern, based on the example of Dobruja, a 
geographical boundary dividing and connecting two neighbouring nation-states, 




If a state can be viewed as a set of functioning interconnections, then the 
issue of “othering” and mutual Balkanization turns into a quest for establishing 
cultural, historical and political links between a region and the core of an 
idealized nation-state. In this case, the actual identities of the inhabitants of the 
land had little significance to the prominent public participants involved in the 
debates. The population could be resettled, reshaped or suppressed with varying 
degrees of success (Dragostinova 2009: 185-212). What truly mattered for the 
state-builders was “region-branding”, the creation of a “suitable identity”. 
Furthermore, they clung to the idea of a direct link between their respective state 
and a borderland zone predictably contested and challenged by their opponents. 
From the 15th century onward, Dobrogea functioned as a border zone of 
the Ottoman Empire and one of the most forward Muslim military bastions in 
South-eastern Europe. Between 1768 and 1878, the province served as a transit 
corridor and military battlefield in a long series of Russo-Ottoman wars (Iordachi 
2002: 1-2). Ottoman control over Dobruja lasted until 1878, when the Great 
Powers at the Congress of Berlin ceded the region, together with the Danube 
Delta, to Romania, while its southern portion remained with the newly-
established Bulgaria. In return for this new possession, Romania had to cede 
Bessarabia to Russia (Michelson 1989); this requirement, however, aroused great 
controversy in Romanian political elite circles. Frederick Kellogg noted that 
Romanian Foreign Minister Mihail Kogĉlniceanu viewed Dobruja primarily as a 
boundary that could keep Russia away from the Danube, while Ion Brĉtianu, 
Romania’s prime minister and a notable politician, saw it as a vital region for free 
navigation on the Danube (Kellog 1995: 199-201). 
Dobruja, with its ethnic diversity, could not be easily incorporated into 
either Bulgaria or Romania: at around 1880, a plurality of the north Dobrujan 
population consisted of Turks and Tatars (Dĉnescu 1903: 15-20; Vakarelski 1964: 
9). Even in 1930, after a number of significant changes had affected the region in 
the preceding decades, 22.4% of the entire Dobrujan population (which already 
was already incorporated into Greater Romania) considered Turkish their mother 
tongue (Mihĉilescu et al. 1938: 620). 
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“Identity” in the case of disputed territories had little to do with individual 
self-identification and was rather a project of various intellectual circles trying to 
appropriate the land.1 In the case of Dobruja, those elites relied heavily on the 
re-interpreted Western experiences of modernization and state-building 
(Daskalov, Mishkova 2013: 1-99). Therefore, the disputed land and its 
significance reflected the state-building projects of the subsequent country. In 
multi-cultural Dobruja, the identity of its population before the debate was 
hardly prominent and politically voiced. Hence, the idea underlying Romanian 
state-building propaganda went beyond the simple creation of a new identity for 
the local Lipovans, Bulgarians, Turks and Tatars, also assuming the “export” of 
suitable “Romanians” to the province, while marking the space as culturally 
Romanian (Kuzmanova 1989: 17-18). Therefore, one may refer not to a case of 
an “identity creation”, but rather to a viable pattern of establishing and 
cultivating links that, in their turn, would spur identities that could fit into a 
grander state-building plan. 
“Nationalizing” a region 
On November 5, 1913, Simeon Radev, a Bulgarian historian, journalist, 
diplomat and politician, wrote to Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikola Genadiev 
regarding the stance of Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy on the status of Dobruja 
in Bulgarian-Romanian relations: “Prince Furstenberg has conveyed to me his 
impressions after having spoken with the king in the following form: ‘All 
Romanians, beginning with the king, perceive the physical superiority of the 
Bulgarian over the Romanian race’.2 They are convinced that even within the 
limits of today’s borders, Bulgaria will become the greatest military power among 
the Balkan states” (Radev 1913/1992: 237). This account by Radev still contains 
traces of doubt over the seriousness of the Romanian plans concerning 
Cadrilater, the southern part of the region. Radev, deeply involved in the 
diplomatic affairs which later resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest 
                                                                 
1  In most cases, the population remained indifferent to the fierce debates of the so-called 
public figures and politicians either in Romania or Bulgaria, reacting only in cases of the 
latter’s direct involvement with the well-being of local residents. Regarding the concept 
of “indifference”, see Rudolf Stichweh (Stichweh 1997: 1-16). 
2  It should be noted that Radev’s use of the word “race” refers more to the superior 
cultural and historical heritage of the Bulgarians, rather than bloodlines specifically, 
which he did not present as an argument later. 
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and himself becoming minister plenipotentiary in the Romanian capital, fully 
realized that the treaty would lead to devastating consequences and the loss of 
lands unless Bulgaria adapted to the situation. Radev’s country had to continue 
considering itself the greatest power on the Balkans, employing a sort of a self-
directed propaganda that necessarily also influenced its opponents and potential 
allies.3 
Similarly to Bulgaria, Romania had to adopt strategies that would allow 
portrayal of the full incorporation of Dobruja into the country as a natural 
outcome of a state-building process that had already taken root in “prepared” 
soil. For the Romanian side, the mere idea of annexation of Cadrilater initially 
appeared almost as contradictory as the previous dispute regarding Northern 
Dobruja (Hitchins 1994: 153-157; Iordachi 2002: 9-10; Ungureanu 2005: 19-25; 
Kuzmanova 1989: 18-19). In the 1940s, Mihail Manoilescu, a Romanian journalist, 
politician and later foreign minister, wrote about the annexation of Cadrilater: 
“Research into the documents from the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913, 
undertaken by officials of the Ministry at my behest, did not yield even a trace of 
justification for the annexation of Cadrilater other than the foolish point 
regarding the strategic border, compounded by the shameful argument 
concerning compensation for Bulgarian territorial growth” (Manoilescu 1991: 
179). 
The “justification” was a vital aspect of establishing a link between 
Dobruja and the rest of the Romanian lands. Therefore, it was hardly the opinion 
of its population or its continually fluid allegiances that truly mattered. The 
“regional identity” existed in the heads of the prominent public actors, who 
grasped for Dobruja as a strategically important piece of land with the vestiges 
of certain legacies “primed for interpretation”. Therefore, Romanian 
archaeologists working in the province created its identity and established links 
with the fluid body of the nation just as successfully as did prominent political 
actors (Hamilakis 2007). They provided “physical proof” of the presence of a 
needed legacy, as in the case of Vasile Pârvan conducting his excavations in 
Dobruja (Culea 1928: 9). The findings were, consequently, supported by the 
always effective civilizational claim (Iordachi 2000: 239-264). Although the 
Romanian “civilizing mission” of struggling against underdevelopment in a 
                                                                 
3  For further details on Radev’s views and considerations about the period preceding and 
following the treaty of Berlin, see his major work ˁ̨̛̛̯̬̯̖̣̯̖̦̌ ̭̻̬̖̥̖̦̦̏̌ 
ʥ̛̻̣̬̐̌́/The Builders of the Modern Bulgaria (Radev 1973). 
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formerly backward Ottoman region had its own particularities, it was not too 
different from the Bulgarian idea of being the most developed and accomplished 
nation in the region. In both cases, the territory had to be appropriately branded 
in order to render it as part of the state (it could be both the Roman legacy and 
the heritage of the Second Bulgarian Empire). In both variants, this 
“nationalization” was accomplished not by simple othering, but through a 
carefully moulded link. Subsequently, those cultural and historical links to the 
modern state were thwarted by their respective opponents and both 
propagandistic strategies clashed (Schmidt-Rösler 1994: 101-103). 
Bulgarian propaganda in Cadrilater was aimed at mobilizing the Bulgarian-
oriented population to fight against Romanian rule through various newspapers, 
leaflets and volunteers present in the region. Émigré organizations in northern 
Bulgaria and Sofia stood behind this propaganda; however, according to 
Romanian propaganda, it came “directly from the Bulgarian government” 
(Schmidt-Rösler 1994: 101-103). Nevertheless, the Bulgarian government itself 
did not seem to have any significant control over the Dobrujan organizations that 
in many cases acted independently and without consent from the Central 
Powers. Yet they managed to attract a number of influential Bulgarian scholars 
as well as foreign attention to the Dobrujan dispute, while trying to strike a 
balance between Germany, France, the newly-formed Turkey and several other 
world and European Powers. 
The peace conference in Paris in 1919 (Nyagulov et al. 2007: 275) did not 
result in a desirable outcome from the Bulgarian point of view. Dobruja remained 
under Romania’s control. Nevertheless, Romania no longer could successfully 
appeal to the idea of a “Bulgarian peril” after occupying Bessarabia and Northern 
Bucovina (Nyagulov et al. 2007: 275-276) and fulfilling the plan of “Greater 
Romania”. From 1919 until the signing of the Treaty of Craiova, Dobruja became 
the stage for Bulgaria’s poorly organized attempts to mobilize the local 
population and prevent the Romanian side from assimilating and colonizing the 
region. 
For Romania, Dobruja, especially its newly acquired southern part, 
became a territory open for active propaganda that had to shape Romanian 
culture in the province. For a task of this magnitude, propaganda had to be 
created by the state and embrace all the possible facets of life in Dobruja 
(Nyagulov et al. 2007: 290-301). It had to attract settlers, Aromanians, or 
migrants from other parts of the country by offering them a place to live and land 
to cultivate, sustaining the idea of a “flourishing Romanian culture” in the region 
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and justifying territorial claims to the land. This “blooming Romanian culture”, 
hardly existent in Northern Dobruja prior to 1878 and virtually non-existent in 
Cadrilater before 1913 (Livizeanu 1995), required state investments. 
In this case the border became a meeting point of the two “civilizing 
missions”: the Romanian idea of saving the region from barbarism and 
underdevelopment, and the Bulgarian quest for “Greater Bulgaria”. Therefore, 
the borderland had to be more Bulgarian or Romanian than the rest of these two 
respective states. The Bulgarian and Romanian civilizing missions were aimed at 
creating a space where their nation- and state-building ideas would be officially 
institutionalized. In this case, Romania certainly had leverage, since it controlled 
Dobruja most of the time during the period under analysis. 
Exchanging words 
The texts of several active participants of the territorial debate from both 
sides represent interesting reflections on the arguments the Romanian and 
Bulgarian sides commonly used to brand the region. Although they came from 
different backgrounds, the authors usually presented similar approaches to the 
issue. They appealed to certain credible legacies and connections in order to 
prove the markedly Romanian/Bulgarian character of the province and spur new 
viable cultural links. These protagonists not only included eminent historians 
such as Iorga or Mutafchiev, diplomats, journalists and philosophers, but also, for 
instance, a former prisoner of war (Vlĉdescu 1926). Although the texts belong to 
different genres, including memoirs, novels, leaflets, educational pamphlets and 
seminar proceedings, all of them refer to Dobruja as a part of the essential and 
vitally important Romanian/Bulgarian state. 
Anastas Ishirkov,4 already in the introduction to his work “The Bulgarians 
in Dobruja”, described Dobruja as the natural extension and integral part of the 
Bulgarian state (Ischirkoff 1919: 8-10). Unlike Romanians, Bulgarians, according 
to Ishirkov, did not need to “colonize” Dobruja; they only had to mobilize the 
existing Bulgarian elements in order to regain the territory that had been “paid 
for by blood”. Ishirkov wrote: “The peace of Bucharest in 1918 provoked great 
disillusionment among the Dobrujan population, especially among the Bulgarians 
from Northern Dobruja, who thought that they would forever remain under the 
                                                                 




Romanian yoke. They could not understand how, after all of the sacrifices made 
by the Bulgarian people, they could again become a bargaining chip for foreign 
economic and political interests” (Ischirkoff 1919: 126-127). Describing the 
National congresses of Dobruja, Ishirkov highlighted the existence of a 
“Bulgarian-feeling” and “Bulgarian-thinking” audience, the “affirmed nation” 
that was already present in that land.5 That nation was, undoubtedly, linked to 
his nation-state. However, Ishirkov omitted mentioning the Romanian, Tatar, 
Turkish or any other element of the region’s rather non-homogeneous 
population. 
Milan Markov, another Bulgarian voice in the debate, presented very 
similar arguments, stating that Bulgarian resistance inside Dobruja, various 
Romanian colonizing attempts and, finally, integration of the entire region into 
Romania “constitutes in itself the most striking demonstration, originating within 
Romania itself, of the indisputable Bulgarian character of Dobroudja” (Markov 
1917: 32). Attacking the Romanian policy of assimilating the region and “changing 
its (predominantly Bulgarian, in his view) character, Markov pointed out: “And 
since the real complexion of the country was of just such a nature, since 
Dobroudja was totally alien to Romania, it was quite natural that assimilation 
should also be violent in nature” (Markov 1917: 15). In this case, the polemics 
acquired new features as they were driven toward the edges of the two cultural 
programs – the Romanian and the Bulgarian – both aimed at presenting their 
ideas before foreign and, to a much lesser extent, local (Romanian and Bulgarian) 
audiences. 
Another propagandistic text, the “Memoir from the Central National 
Council of Dobroudja to the representatives of the states called together to 
restore the peace among the nations”, referred to the Bulgarian ideas of 
constructing Greater Bulgaria with a homogeneous population and opposing 
“unbearable Romanian oppression” (Central National Council of Dobroudja 1919: 
42). The attacks directed at Romanian domination in Dobruja generally referred 
to the atrocities committed by the local authorities. In some cases, they cited 
supporting evidence, while in others they absolutely neglected these aspects: “In 
normal times, the inhabitants of Dobroudja had even under the Turks all the 
liberties and almost all the guarantees, which they now have under the 
                                                                 
5  A year before 1919, Ischirkoff published another book on the problem of the Dobruja 
region featuring similar themes, but with more intense economic and political 
overtones (Ishirkov 1918). 
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Romanians”, however, they also had “equal rights, which the Romanians could 
not secure to them” (Central National Council of Dobroudja 1919: 25). 
The authors of later texts authors viewed the problem similarly; however, 
knowing the outcomes of the Treaty of Bucharest better, they accorded more 
attention to the social and economic aspects of the dispute, trying to represent 
the links between the respective states and the region as profitable and 
“natural”. Ivan Penakov, for instance, viewed Dobruja not simply as an essential 
hub of Bulgarian culture, but also as a province that would allow the Bulgarian 
nation to prosper (Penacoff 1928). Hence, he introduced not only the argument 
of “natural development and feasible connections”, but also addressed the 
“competing state-building projects” (Penacoff 1928: 46-48). Since “national 
identity” is always multi-dimensional and impossible to reduce to a single 
element (Smith 1995: 182), it constitutes a mosaic of multiple re-interpreted 
legacies. Those legacies become the core of the process of identity construction, 
which, in fact, is a series of justifications of heritages, manifested in multiple 
interconnections, as seen in Penakov’s text. 
Like its Bulgarian counterpart, the Romanian one had to generate 
elaborate propagandistic strategies in order to construct a splendid image of 
Romanian Dobruja. The Dobrogea (Stoicĉ 1919), edited by Professor Vasile 
Stoicĉ, openly referred to “Romania’s civilizing work in the region” (Stoicĉ 1919: 
13-18). Bulgarian activists apparently viewed these “civilizing actions” as the 
already mentioned “Romanian oppression”. Similar to Iorga’s “What do we 
represent in Dobruja?” (Iorga 1910) published before the Treaty of Bucharest was 
signed, Stoica’s work contains familiar intonations when appealing to Romania’s 
Roman heritage in Dobruja, which had to be stressed, since without this piece of 
land stretching from the Black Sea to the Danube, Romania as a state and 
Romanians as a nation would have been incomplete. 
The idea of “colonization” for making a nation “complete” was very 
thoroughly elaborated by another Romanian author, Romulus SeiƔanu, in a book 
that considered all aspects of the region’s life, from its natural resources and 
ethnical structure in different periods to the province’s political history. The 
colonization of the land, mainly by migrants from Macedonia, was viewed as 
compensation for the human losses in the war of 1877-1878 (SeiƔanu 1928: 181-
187). In the section entitled “The exceptional regime and constitution of Dobruja” 
(SeiƔanu 1928: 202), the author underlined the importance of the Romanian 
nation-state as an “indivisible” network regulated according to an “exceptional 
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constitution”.6 Furthermore, the Romanian side was compensating the absence 
of the already existing flourishing Romanian culture in Cadrilater before 1913 by 
claiming to have an “exceptionally” successful nation-state that assured the 
prosperity of the region within Romania’s borders. 
Centralizing a country 
It should be noted that even in the Romanian case, one should not focus 
on one particular centralization project that included Dobruja as one of several 
provinces that had to be fully integrated and assimilated. Even before union with 
the Old Kingdom (Wallachia and Moldova), the Romanian National Party in 
Transylvania and Banat, led by Iuliu Maniu and Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, 
supported the idea of creating a federal state (Scurtu 1983: 12-13). While it 
became one of the main parties in the country with significant power and 
favoured the establishment of autonomous provinces, the National Liberal Party 
nevertheless imposed its doctrine of high centralization of the country. 
The inevitable clash of the two parties resulted in Romania allying with the 
Entente in 1916 and Ion Brĉtianu’s domination of Romanian politics, which 
further explained the active attempts at centralization. In 1919, the Peasant 
Party, which opposed Brĉtianu’s Liberal Party, managed to achieve significant 
influence for a brief period, only failing in 1922 (Scurtu 1983: 12-13). 
Consequently, the Dobrujan debate coincided with the dispute concerning the 
administrative organization of Romania. Arguing with Brĉtianu’s views, 
Constantin Stere expressed his ideas about the possibility of a federal state, citing 
the principles of national sovereignty and local autonomy that several of the 
regions had under foreign rule (Avornic et al. 2008: 2-6; 12). According to Stere, 
attempts at forced unification of already emancipated regions could not achieve 
the desirable result of “unity” (Stere 1922: 44-45). The nature of interconnections 
remained similar, according to Stere, yet the modes for introducing them ignited 
fierce debates. 
The same opinion, albeit expressed more as a “wish for more voluntary 
options” than for actual political autonomy, was expressed by Iuliu Maniu, who 
observed in 1919: “When I declared the unification, I declared it unconditionally, 
without reserving special provincial rights, because I have and I still faithfully 
                                                                 
6  Apparently, by “exceptional constitution”, SeiƔanu meant “progressive and innovative 
Romanian law” (SeiƔanu 1928: 202). 
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believe that unified Romania should be one within its legislative parts, one within 
its governance, one within its spirit, its thought in all the public institutions of the 
state” (Maniu 1919: 219). Therefore, the main tendency of Romanian state-
building projects was still that of creating a unified country, and propaganda 
related to the integration of the provinces was in most cases regulated and 
supported by the state (Nyagulov et al. 2007: 341-407), which, however, 
admitted the existence of other views on policies implemented in the regions. 
Conclusion: interconnections reshaped 
The political actors on both sides regarded their borderlands as parts of 
the nation’s body that they had to carefully reattach, while creating a system of 
viable interconnections based on credible legacies. The region’s “differences” 
had to be perfectly accommodated, first and foremost because of its strategic 
position, i.e., its proximity to the “neighbour”. The opinions of local inhabitants 
mattered little to either highly-educated and prominent scholars like Mutafchiev 
or Iorga, or to various diplomats, journalists and publicists like Milan Markov or 
Romulus SeiƔanu. The Dobrujan dispute represents an intriguing example of how 
astute historians, journalists, writers, diplomats and other active participants in 
the debate transformed a borderland province of, initially, limited importance 
(compared to other territories with Romanian and Bulgarian populations) 
(Roudometof 2002: 5-29; Hitchins 1985) into one of the most crucial focal points 
that played a major role in the nation-building strategies of both Romanians and 
Bulgarians. 
A nation was “largely an abstract entity that was invoked and symbolized 
through flags, schools, holiday celebrations” (Karakasidou 1997: 163), while “the 
state had a very concrete existence to area residents, embodied in the form of 
civil administrators, tax collectors, and policemen posted to the village” 
(Karakasidou 1997: 163). Successful incorporation of a territory depended on a 
variety of economic factors as well as the ability of political activists to properly 
represent them. 
This aspect of “underdevelopment”7 forced Romania and Bulgaria to 
attempt to overcome their “backwardness” while investing significant effort into 
various modernization schemes. Linked to the dissemination of education and 
                                                                 
7 The terms of “underdevelopment” and “backwardness” are highly stigmatized and 
notoriously overused when referring to the Balkan cases and their analysis from the 
point of view of the dominant European political model.(Roudometof 2000: 144-163)  
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culture, which is clearly illustrated by the Bulgarian, Greek or Romanian revivals 
(Mishkova 1994: 63-93), modernization itself was accompanied by nationalism 
(Daskalov 1998: 208), which was a driving issue for each of these states. Engaged 
in establishing patterns of social networking, the political actors from both sides 
failed to offer viable modernizing plans for the region. 
While every borderland dispute is an example of mutual othering and 
attempts at re-interpreting certain legacies that have to match the dominant 
nation and state-building narrative, it also encompasses another important 
tendency. Political actors engaged in constructing borderland identities do not 
simply refer to identities as such, but in fact, forge important links that connect 
the borderland to the other parts of the nation-state. So, while othering and re-
interpreting legacies remain an important part of the process, the true aim it 
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